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RECENT CASES
We do not believe it is cynical to suggest that complete
submisrapport is not always reached. It is not unbelievable that
15

sion is bad as a convenient avoidance of imminent trouble.

Thus, this writer is in full accord with the statement of law
enunciated by Keezer. Mere cohabitation and probable or actual
sexual intercourse following the accrual of the cause of action for
divorce based on cruelty should not result in condonation unless there
is an unequivocal intent to forgive and resume marital relations.
Kentucky has, by dictum in the principal case, seemingly placed itself
among the followers of this rule. Although not stating in affirmative
language what facts will constitute condonation of cruelty the Kentucky court has stated negatively that, ".

. condonation will not be

implied from either living together or acts of coition."1 6 (Emphasis
supplied). The ascertainable affirmative implication from this statement would seem to be that no condonation will arise unless there is
proven an unequivocal intent to forgive. Thus Kentucky has not
made condonation as applied to cruelty too difficult of proof but has
merely declared itself a follower of the better rule.
J. MoNTjoy TnuvmLE
PRAcrCE AND PROCEDUPE-STATUTES OF LnLTATIONS-INTERPRETATION
OF SAVING CLAUSEs-Plaintiff, as ancillary administrator, brought suit

on May 4, 1958, in Oldham Circuit Court against defendant for negligently killing plaintiff's decedent in an automobile accident on Feb.
12, 1951. Decedents domiciliary administrator, an Ohio resident, had
previously on July 12, 1951, brought a similar suit in Federal District
Court for the Western District of Kentucky, which had been dismissed
on the ground that the Ohio administrator could not maintain the
action in Kentucky. Plaintiff was then appointed ancillary administrator, and brought suit in the federal District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky on January 20, 1952, less than a year after the accident, and thus before the statute of limitations had run. On April
28, 1952, this suit was dismissed because of lack of jurisdiction, the
District Court failing to find any diversity of citizenship since both the
plaintiff and the defendant were residents of Kentucky. This judgment was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals on Feb. 16,
1953.1 Relying upon Kentucky Revised Statutes 413.270,2 which pro" Supra note 2 at 555.
1

20Id. at 556.

Ockerman v. Wise, 202 F. 2d 144 (6th Cir. 1953).

S"If an action is commenced in due time and in good faith in any court of
this state and the defendants or any of them make defense, and it is adjudged
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vides that a party who has brought suit in "any court of this state" and
had it dismissed for lack of jurisdiction may bring suit in the proper
court within three months after such judgment, the plaintiff on May 4,
1953, brought the instant suit in Oldham Circuit Court. The defendant
pleaded the one-year statute of limitations, and argued that the running of the statute had not been tolled by plaintiff's action in federal
court because a federal court was not a "court of this state" within
the meaning of the statute. Defendant also contended that even if it
were, the plaintiff's suit had not been brought "within three months
from the time of that judgment," since "judgment" as used in the
Kentucky tolling statute meant the judgment of the trial court and not
the judgment of the appellate court which had merely affirmed the
judgment below. The trial court adopted defendant's view of the law
and dismissed the case, but the Court of Appeals reversed, ordering
the case to proceed to trial on its merits. Ockerman v. Wise, 274 S.W.
2d 385 (Ky. 1954).3
The Court, in examining the question of whether a federal district
court is a "court of this state," relied primarily on Merko v. Sturm &
Dillard Co.,4 a federal case interpreting the same Kentucky statute.
In the Merko case the plaintiff, after having a seasonably filed suit
dismissed from federal court on the grounds that he had not sued the
defendant, an out-of-state corporation, in the district of its residence,
brought another action in state court although the one-year statute of
limitations had run. On the basis of diversity of citizenship, the defendant had this suit removed to federal court, the same federal court,
incidentally, whose jurisdiction he had successfully denied earlier.
He then made the same plea that the defendant made in the Ockerman
case-that the action brought in the state court was barred by the oneyear statute of limitations, and was not saved by the tolling statute
since the federal district court was not a "court of this state". As in the
Ockerman case, the trial court agreed with this contention, but the
federal court of appeals reversed on the grounds that the legislative
purpose was to permit adjudication on the merits of a claim and that
the statute was not to be narrowly construed. In following this precedent, the Kentucky court decided exactly the same point that the
that the court has no jurisdiction of the action, the plaintiff or his representative
may, within three months from the time of that judgment, commence a new
action in the proper court. The time between the commencement of the first and
last action
shall not be counted in applying any statute of limitation."
8
Rehearing denied, Jan. 28, 1955.
=283
F. 68 (6th Cir. 1916).
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federal court had decided earlier and reached exactly the same conclusion.5
It is submitted that the court reached the correct result in so ruling.
There is, however, some Kentucky authority pointing toward a contrary conclusion. For example, in interpreting this same statute, the
court bad held that the Workmen's Compensation Board is not a
"court of this state."6 In interpreting another Kentucky statute,7 the
court held that the phrase, "any of the courts of the Commonwealth",
did not include federal courts." However, that statute deals with the
duties of the county attorney,9 and therefore the case is clearly distinguishable. In concluding that the legislature intended to include
federal courts within our tolling statute, the court reached a result
which seems reasonable and in accord with the great weight of
authority.' 0
In its analysis, the court treated the first suit filed in federal court
(the suit filed by the Ohio administrator) as without legal significance
for purposes of the statute of limitation, since that suit was not filed
by a qualified party." Although this is the well-settled Kentucky rule,
it seems to the writer to be an overly narrow interpretation of Kentucky Revised Statutes 413.270.12 The statute seems to put the emphasis on the good faith of the plaintiff. In the instant case this interpretation did not affect the decision, since the second suit in federal
court by the properly qualified ancillary administrator was brought before the one-year statute of limitations had run.' 3
'For the converse of this proposition, i.e. when the suit had been dismissed
from state court on jurisdictional grounds and then reopened in Federal Court,
see Fulkerson v. American Chain and Cable Co., 72 F. Supp. 334 (W.D. Pa.
1947). Although the case is from Pennsylvania, it interprets the Kentucky statute
under discussion.
'Sears v. Elcomb Coal Co., 253 Ky. 279, 69 S.W. 2d 382 (1934).
CAruoLLs KENTucKy STATuTEs, 1936, sees. 126, 127, Now Ky. RFv. STAT.
69.210
(1953).
8
Slayton v. Rogers, 128 Ky. 106, 107 S.W. 696 (1908).
9

Ky.

REv. STAT.

69.210 (2) (1953): "The county attorney shall

. . .

when

so directed by the county or fiscal court . . . institute, defend and conduct all
civil actions in which the county is interested before any of the courts of the commonwealth." (Emphasis supplied by writer.)
156 A.L.R. 1097 (1939); 34 Am. Jun. 230 (1941).
Relying chiefly on Vassill's Adm'r v. Scarsella, 292 Ky. 153, 166 S.W. 2d
64 (1942); See also: L. & N. R.R. v. Brantley's Adm'r. 96 Ky. 297, 28 S.W. 477
(1894); Marrett v. Babb's Exr. 91 Ky. 88, 15 S.W. 4 1891).
"Supra Note 2. ,,
"Saving clauses are not ordinarily construed to limit the bringing of actions
after the discharge of a previous action. For example, even if the first suit in this
case had been valid, and even if more than three months had elapsed, after its dismissal, another suit could still have been brought within one year from the date
of the injury. 54 C.J.S. 350 (1948); 83 A.L.R. 486 (1939); 34 Am. JuR. 227
(1941).
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Nevertheless, the plaintiff would have lost the suit had defendant's
definition of "judgment" been accepted. For if "judgment" were taken
to be the final order of the trial court, and not its affirmance upon appeal, the plaintiff's suit in the state court would not have been
brought within the three-month period.
The court rightly stated that the law on this point is in considerable confusion. 14 It is the writer's opinion that the court, in interpreting "judgment" to mean "final decision on appeal," adopted the
better view. The court cited with approval the opinion of the New
York Court of Appeals in a similar case. 15 The New York court
reasoned that a contrary holding would be inconvenient, since it
would require the filing of a second suit while the appeal was pending
-a suit which would be unnecessary if the appeal were successful. In
reaching this result, the court distinguished a prior Kentucky case"8
arising under another statute 7 where "final judgment" was held to
mean the judgment of the trial court and not its affirmance on appeal.
In addition to avoiding the pitfall of the Kentucky precedent, the court
eluded another trap-the "clear meaning rule." For, undoubtedly,
"judgment" ordinarily refers to the final order of a trial court.,' In
the writer's opinion the court is to be commended for looking behind
the precise meaning of the term in order to reach a more reasonable
decision.
In conclusion, it is felt that the court reached a desirable result in
this case. In broadening the term "court of this state" to include
federal courts, and in construing the term "judgment" to mean "final
judgment on appeal", the Court of Appeals further demonstrated its
acceptance of the proposition that cases should be adjudicated on
their merits and not on points of procedure. That the court will not
always give priority to such a policy is indicated by its narrow construction of the Kentucky tolling statute when an improperly qualified
administrator brings the first suit.
1 83 A.L.R. 478 (1933); 34 Am. Jun. 230 (1941).

" Wooster v. Forty-Second Street & G. Ferry Co., 71 N.Y. 471 (1877).

Gray v. Sawyer, 252 S.W. 2d 10 (Ky. 1952).
"CIVIL
CoDE oF PRAcrIcE, sec. 344 (Carrol s Ky. Codes 1948).
'8 See for example, BLACK, LAw DICmTONARY (3rd Edition, 1933), "Judg-

ment .. . the determination of the law, pronounced by a competent judge or
court, as the result of an action or proceeding . . ."; Bo-v

, L&w DIrIONARY

(8th Edition, 1914): "Judgment .. .the decision or sentence of the law, given
by the court of justice or other competent tribunal, as the result of proceedings
instituted therein .. ";BALLENw, LAw DiCoNARY (1930): "Judgment .. .
the final consideration and determination of a court of competent jurisdiction upon
matters submitted to it in an action or proceeding .. " Note that Ballentine does
use the word "final." He also defines 'judgment" as "the last word in a judicial
controversy."
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The court, however, can hardly be blamed for not repudiating this
well-settled rule, especially in a case in which the application of the
rule results in no injustice.' 9 In ordering the case to proceed to trial
on the merits, the court reached a decision amply grounded on both
authority and logic.
Tom SoYABs
STATUTE OF FnAuDs-PEsoNAL SERNwcEs AS PART PERFORMANCE OF
ORAL CoNTRAcr To DEvisE-Plaintiff brought action against decedents

executor to set aside decedent's will, claiming that decedent had orally
contracted to will his property, real and personal, to plaintiff. By the
terms of the contract, plaintiff was to receive the property in return
for services which she performed in caring for decedent before death.
The plaintiff contended that the provision of the Statute of Frauds,
requiring land contracts to be in writing was not applicable. The
plaintiff further contended in the alternative that her situation was
unique since she had already performed the services and since she
had left her home and gone to live with the decedent in order to perform the agreement. Therefore, the contract was without the Statute
of Frauds even though the statute might apply generally to contracts
relating to land. The plaintiff further contended that the contract was
severable; therefore the statute would not apply to that portion of the
contract concerning personalty. In other words, plaintiff sought to
recover either on the theory that the Statute of Frauds did not apply
or that the doctrine of part performance governed the validity of this
particular contract. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the petition, and the plaintiff appealed. Held: Affirmed. Bitzer v. Moock's
Executor and Trustee, 271 S.W. 2d 877 (Ky. 1954). The court explained that contracts to devise property are generally regarded as
entire, and are not severable, despite the fact that the contract includes
both realty and personalty, and an oral contract to devise property
which includes real estate is barred by the Statute of Frauds. Further,
personal services as part performance of a contract to convey or devise
will not remove it from the statute, since the party performing has
grounds for an action at law in quantum meruit to recover the reasonable value of the services peformed.
Although it might appear that the contract in the principal case

'If

the Kentucky Court of Appeals should ever decide to reverse itself on

this point, without actually repudiating its earlier decisions, (see footnote 11) it
might possibly base its change of position on the "spirt of the New Rules" which

the court should treat as authorizing a further liberalization of procedure.

